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Abstract
This paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing
the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input
market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984) to characterize the diﬀerent equilibria. We find that outsourcing
generally softens competition in the final product market. If firms anticipate the
impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices, there may be equilibria where
firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals’ costs. We illustrate our analysis
using a linear Cournot model.
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1 Introduction
Explaining the boundaries of the firm has been a core aspect of the economic theory of
organization since Coase’s (1937) seminal contribution to the theory of the firm. While
much of the existing research has focussed on vertical integration, the reverse step,
i.e. vertical disintegration or outsourcing, has become a widespread phenomenon in the
industrialized world in more recent times. Examples for industries where outsourcing is a
key feature in the organization of production abound: aircraft, cars, computers, mobile
phones, audio/video systems, mechanical watches etc. Casual evidence suggests that
information technology (IT) and other business services are regularly contracted out in
a large number of industries (Domberger 1998). Not surprisingly, econometric studies
assign a prominent role to outsourcing in various industries.1 Therefore, understanding
the economics of outsourcing should help explaining firms’ boundaries.
Following Coase (1937), the choice of a firm’s production mode has often been dis-
cussed in the context of transaction cost analysis, which argues, roughly speaking, that
a firm’s choice of its production mode is based on a comparison of the costs associated
with internal transactions and transactions over the market. Prominent contributions
by Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990) have
further pointed out that asset specificity and incomplete contracts tend to make the or-
ganization of market transactions more diﬃcult, inducing firms to vertically integrate.2
Based on this literature, Grossman and Helpman (2002) study the determinants of the
equilibrium production mode (i.e. integration vs. outsourcing) in industries where inputs
are fully or partially specialized.
A related strand of the literature has focused on international outsourcing, i.e. the
fragmentation of production across borders. For instance, Feenstra and Hanson (1999)
investigate how international outsourcing aﬀects factor productivity and factor rewards
in the U.S.3 In a recent theoretical study, McLaren (2000) analyzes the relation of
international openness and firms’ outsourcing decisions. He provides an original theory of
outsourcing, arguing that international openness “thickens” the market and thus allows
for leaner, less integrated firms.
Finally, a number of papers have highlighted the role of strategic competition for
a firm’s decision to choose a particular production mode. For instance, Bonanno and
1See e.g. Abraham and Taylor (1996), Fixler and Siegel (1999), Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Holmes
(1999), and Görzig and Stephan (2002).
2See Holmström and Roberts (1998) for a recent survey of the literature on firm boundaries.
3Further contributions analyzing the eﬀects of international outsourcing on the U.S. are e.g. Siegel
and Griliches (1991) and Slaughter (2000). See Egger and Egger (2002) for an analysis of the impact
of international outsourcing on European industries.
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Vickers (1988) show that if franchise fees can be used to extract retailers’ surplus, a
manufacturer will choose vertical separation as its organizational mode, since vertical
separation induces more friendly behavior from its rival manufacturer and thus facili-
tates collusion.4 Gal-Or (1999) explores how asymmetric information between a man-
ufacturer and a retailer aﬀects a manufacturer’s decision to integrate with or separate
from a retailer. Chen (2002) examines the eﬀects that economies of scale in the upstream
production process may have on vertical disintegration decisions. Finally, in a recent
contribution, Shy and Stenbacka (2003) analyze how firms may use their organizational
production mode as an instrument of strategic competition. In their model, diﬀeren-
tiated Bertrand duopolists can either undertake irreversible investments into in-house
production facilities for an input, or they can buy that input from a subcontractor, but
at higher variable cost.
In this paper, we build on the latter work on strategic outsourcing and propose a
reduced-form approach towards analyzing sequential strategic outsourcing. More specif-
ically, we suppose that two (potentially asymmetric) firms decide sequentially about
outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an existing input market. As
in Shy and Stenbacka (2003), we assume that the duopolists face a trade-oﬀ between
making irreversible investments and incurring higher marginal cost when making their
“make-or-buy” decisions. However, we also let the input price vary with the industry’s
vertical structure, since a firm’s outsourcing decision will typically aﬀect the input mar-
ket equilibrium. This aspect has been largely ignored in the previous literature.5 By
allowing for a price eﬀect in the input market, we are able to place strategic outsourc-
ing in the broader context of strategic competition in vertically-related oligopolies. In
particular, we are able to explore under what conditions outsourcing may serve as an
instrument of collusion in the final product market and when outsourcing may be geared
towards raising rivals’ cost.6
To analyze strategic sequential outsourcing decisions, we adopt an approach originally
proposed by Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) for the analysis of sequential horizontal mergers.
That is, we use the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984) to provide a general discussion of the potential strategic outsourcing equilibria.
4In a related paper, Jansen (2003) gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some
upstream firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model.
5For instance, McLaren (2000, fn 17) states: “It would be natural to allow the inputs to aﬀect
marginal costs as well, but the resulting price eﬀects would be a tremendous source of additional
complication [...].” To our knowledge, there is only one other paper (on the relation of trade liberalization
and strategic outsourcing) by Chen et al. (forthcoming) that considers input price eﬀects.
6The notion of raising rivals’ cost is familiar from Salop and Scheﬀman (1983, 1987). It is extensively
applied in the industrial organization literature on vertical foreclosure.
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In particular, we discuss the role of changes in input prices associated with sequential
outsourcing for determining the equilibrium. Furthermore, we provide a Cournot model
with linear demand as a specific example to illustrate our analysis.
Our main results are the following: First, in contrast to Shy and Stenbacka (2003), we
find that there may be asymmetric equilibria where one firm outsources the production
of its input whereas the other produces the input internally. Intuitively, the diﬀerence
follows from the fact that in our analysis, there is always a trade-oﬀ between making
irreversible investments and incurring higher marginal cost. This contrasts with Shy and
Stenbacka’s analysis, where a single firm that outsources must cover the entire sunk cost
of the input producer, and outsourcing will thus always be more costly than in-house
production if only one of the two firms outsources.7
Second, asymmetric equilibria are typically driven by the changes in input prices
associated with outsourcing. It is thus crucial to incorporate input price eﬀects into the
analysis of strategic outsourcing. To see this, consider an asymmetric equilibrium where
the first firm strategically abstains from outsourcing so as to induce outsourcing by the
second firm. The rationale of the first firm’s behavior is straightforward: By preventing
an initial increase of the input price, the second firm is induced to outsource and thus
increase its own marginal cost (this particular behavior of the first firm will be called a
“Puppy Dog” strategy). Unsurprisingly, an asymmetric equilibrium where the first firm
outsources so as to prevent outsourcing by the second firm (the “Top Dog” strategy) does
not exist. The intuition is again straightforward: The first firm will actually benefit from
the second firm’s marginal cost increase associated with outsourcing, provided that it
has not already outsourced. The first firm will thus not be willing to prevent outsourcing
by own outsourcing.
Third, there may be a symmetric equilibrium where the first firm’s outsourcing in-
duces the second firm to outsource (the first firm here adopts a “Fat Cat” strategy). In
this equilibrium, firms successively outsource production to the input market to raise
their marginal costs, thereby softening competition in the final product market. That is,
a “wave” of consecutive outsourcing decisions may serve as a collusive device. Interest-
ingly, there may also be a symmetric equilibrium where the first firm does not outsource
to avoid triggering outsourcing by the second firm (the “Lean & Hungry Look” strategy).
Intuitively, this equilibrium may emerge if the softening of competition generated by a
wave of outsourcing decisions is insuﬃcient to compensate the first firm for its marginal
7In eﬀect, Shy and Stenbacka (2003) are imposing that outsourcing becomes equivalent to setting up
an input market that was inexistent before that firm’s decision to outsource. The input to be outsourced
in their model is therefore best understood as being specifically tailored to the needs of the production
of the final good under consideration.
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cost increase. The first firm will then strategically prevent successive outsourcing.
Summing up, we find that outsourcing the production of the input good generally
softens competition in the final product market. In the symmetric equilibrium where
both firms source the input good over the market (the outsourcing wave), the softening
of competition is collusive in nature. In the asymmetric equilibrium where only the
second firm outsources, the softening of competition is strategically induced by the first
firm, but the second firm’s marginal cost increase is self-inflicted. Finally, the first firm
will strategically avoid triggering an outsourcing wave if the softening of competition
associated with it is insuﬃcient to increase its profit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the basic
setup of our analysis, and in section 3 we discuss the various candidate equilibria. As a
specific example, we present a linear Cournot model in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Setup
Consider a duopoly where two firms sell a final product (e.g. aluminium) to their cus-
tomers in some retail market. Each of the firms i = A,B operates a firm-specific
technology characterized by the tuple {ci, Fi} to produce a non-specific input good
(e.g. electricity), i.e., potentially one of the firms may have a cost advantage in pro-
ducing the non-specific input good. Assume that firms transform the input good into
the final product at constant marginal cost. Now, suppose that rather than producing
the input good in-house, firms may outsource the production of the input good, i.e. they
may buy the input good from an input market at equilibrium market price w. Assume
w.l.o.g. that firm A decides about its mode of organization before firm B, and let Vi
reflect firm i’s outsourcing decision (“make-or-buy”) such that
Vi =
(
0, if there is no outsourcing (“make”),
1, if there is outsourcing (“buy”),
i = A,B.
In general, the equilibrium input market price w will be a function of the firms’ out-
sourcing decisions Vi, i = A,B, since the latter aﬀect the level of demand in the input
market. Therefore, we henceforth write the equilibrium input market price as w(VA, VB).
In the following, we shall make use of the following basic assumptions:
(A1) w(VA, VB) > ci, i = A,B.
(A2) w(VA, VB) is increasing in Vi, i = A,B.
Assumption (A1) imposes that the equilibrium price in the input market is strictly
higher than the internal marginal cost of either firm manufacturing the input good.
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Intuitively, this means that there is a mark-up in the input market associated with
imperfect competition. Note that (A1) also restricts attention to non-trivial strategic
outsourcing: If (A1) is violated, outsourcing will be a dominant strategy for at least one
of the firms.8 Since we want to focus on strategic outsourcing in this paper, we shall
exclude such cases. (A2) implies that a firm’s decision to outsource the production of
the input good increases the equilibrium price in the input market, since demand in
the input market increases with vertical separation. This contrasts with the literature
on vertical foreclosure,9 where a firm’s decisions to integrate usually implies that it will
strategically withhold supply from the input market, so that input market prices increase
with vertical integration. This crucial diﬀerence arises since in our model a firm’s decision
to outsource increases demand in the input market, but does not aﬀect supply.10 Firm
i’s strategic outsourcing decision thus deals with a trade-oﬀ similar to that in Shy and
Stenbacka (2003): Firms face irreversible investment costs Fi and constant marginal
costs ci in the case of in-house production, and higher marginal cost w (·) > ci in the
case of outsourcing.
We denote firm i’s reduced form profit by πi(VA, VB), i = A,B.11 For the following
discussion, it is helpful to introduce a number of profit diﬀerentials that characterize
the profitability of a firm’s outsourcing decision, where the subscript denotes the firm
under consideration and the superscript indicates whether only one or both firms decide
to outsource (see Table 1).
Table 1: Profit diﬀerentials associated with outsourcing
profit diﬀerential description
∆1A := πA(1, 0)− πA(0, 0) profitability of A’s outsourcing alone
∆2A := πA(1, 1)− πA(0, 1) profitability of A’s outsourcing when B also outsources
∆1B := πB(0, 1)− πB(0, 0) profitability of B’s outsourcing alone
∆2B := πB(1, 1)− πB(1, 0) profitability of B’s outsourcing when A also outsources
∆1−B := πA(0, 1)− πA(0, 0) eﬀect of B’s outsourcing alone on A
∆2−B := πA(1, 1)− πA(1, 0) eﬀect of B’s outsourcing on A when A has outsourced
Using the profit diﬀerentials introduced in Table 1, we can distinguish four diﬀerent
types of play:
8For instance, consider the case where cA < w(VA, VB) ≤ cB . In this case, outsourcing will be a
dominant strategy for firm B.
9Sey Rey and Tirole (forthcoming) for a comprehensive survey of the foreclosure literature.
10That is, a firm’s decision to outsource implies that it no longer produces the input good.
11Note that various forms of product market competition (e.g. Cournot or Bertrand with diﬀerentiated
products) are consistent with this setup.
6
(i) ∆1B < 0;∆2B < 0 : Firm B’s dominant strategy is to produce the input good
in-house (VB = 0), i.e., firm B will “make” rather than “buy” the input good,
independent of firm A’s decision. Firm A will thus decide to outsource the pro-
duction of the input good if ∆1A ≥ 0.
(ii) ∆1B > 0;∆2B > 0 : Firm B’s dominant strategy is to outsource (VB = 1) and pay
the market price w, i.e., firm B will “buy” rather than “make” the input good,
independent of firm A’s decision. Firm A will thus decide to outsource if ∆2A ≥ 0.
(iii) ∆1B > 0 > ∆2B : Firm B’s optimal choice of VB depends on firm A’s choice of VA.
More specifically, it is [not] profitable for firm B to outsource the production of the
input good if firm A has decided to “make” [“buy”] the input good. Firm A will
thus be willing to outsource–thereby strategically preventing B’s outsourcing–if
πA(1, 0) > πA(0, 1).
(iv) ∆1B < 0 < ∆2B : Firm B’s optimal choice of VB depends on firm A’s choice of
VA again. More specifically, it is [not] profitable for firm B to outsource the
production of the input good if firm A has decided to “buy” [“make”] the input
good. Firm A will thus be willing to outsource–thereby strategically triggering
B’s outsourcing–if πA(1, 1) > πA(0, 0).
If market conditions are such that type (i) or type (ii) of play occurs, strategic
interactions matter only insofar as they determine the firms’ reduced form profits πi, i =
A,B, by some form of imperfect product market competition. The firms’ equilibrium
choices of the production mode themselves, however, are void of strategic interactions,
since firm B has a dominant strategy in both cases (in-house production under type (i)
and outsourcing under type (ii)). Types (i) and (ii) of play are thus ruled out by (A1).
In the following, we therefore focus on type (iii) and type (iv) of play. To analyze firms’
decisions under these types, it is useful to apply the well-known taxonomy of business
strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). Table 2 reproduces the diﬀerent
strategies for the sequential outsourcing game under consideration.
Using terminology familiar from Tirole (1988, 325), we will say that outsourcing
makes firm A “tough” if it prevents further outsourcing by firm B (the left column of
the table) and “soft” if it triggers further outsourcing by firm B (the right column).
More specifically, if outsourcing makes firmA tough (i.e. prevents further outsourcing
by firm B), firm A should “make” rather than “buy” the input good if outsourcing by B
increases its profit. That is, A should choose the low activity level (VA = 0) to look soft
or inoﬀensive (Puppy Dog). However, if outsourcing by B decreases its profit, A should
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Table 2: Taxonomy of business strategies
Should A outsource for strategic reasons?
Outsourcing by A ...
... prevents outsourcing by B. ... triggers outsourcing by B.
(∆1B > 0 > ∆2B) (∆1B < 0 < ∆2B)
Outsourcing by B ...
... increases A’s profit. No Yes
(∆1−B > 0 or ∆2−B > 0) “Puppy Dog” “Fat Cat”
... decreases A’s profit. Yes No
(∆1−B < 0 or ∆2−B < 0) “Top Dog” “Lean & Hungry Look”
“buy” from the input market so as to prevent B’s outsourcing, i.e. A should choose the
high activity level (VA = 1) to look tough or aggressive (Top Dog).
Conversely, if outsourcing makes firm A soft (i.e. triggers further outsourcing by
firm B), firm A should “buy” rather than “make” the input good if outsourcing by B
increases its profit. That is, A should choose the high activity level (VA = 1) to look
soft or inoﬀensive (Fat Cat). However, if outsourcing by B decreases its profit, A should
“make” rather than “buy” the input good so as to prevent B’s outsourcing, i.e. A should
choose the low activity level (VA = 0) to look tough or aggressive (Lean & Hungry Look).
3 Analyzing Outsourcing Equilibria
In this section, we discuss whether and how the candidate equilibria put forward in Table
2 come about in the sequential outsourcing game under consideration. In particular, we
shall argue that the eﬀect of outsourcing on the equilibrium input price w(·) is crucial
for understanding strategic outsourcing decisions.
3.1 Candidate Equilibria
Let us start with a discussion of the cases where outsourcing by firm B increases firm
A’s profit (the first row in Table 2, with ∆1−B > 0 or ∆2−B > 0, respectively).
First, consider the Puppy Dog strategy, where firm A does not outsource so as to
induce outsourcing by firm B. Under these circumstances, we know that outsourcing by
firm B alone is profitable (∆1B > 0). Furthermore, B’s outsourcing increases A’s profit
(∆1−B > 0). Intuitively, the latter follows from the fact that, after outsourcing, firm B
acquires the input good at higher marginal cost (w(0, 1) > cB by (A1)) and thus becomes
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a less aggressive competitor.12 Also, outsourcing makes A tough and prevents further
outsourcing by B (∆2B < 0). This preemptive eﬀect arises since after A’s outsourcing,
additional outsourcing by B would yield a higher input market price (w(1, 1) > w(0, 1)
by (A2)), making outsourcing less attractive from B’s point of view. Note that there
is an interesting relation between the Puppy Dog strategy under sequential outsourcing
and the industrial organization literature on raising rivals’ cost, initiated by Salop and
Scheﬀman (1983, 1987). In the latter, a raising rivals’ cost eﬀect is typically associated
with aggressive behavior on the part of a vertically integrated firm (i.e. a firm that
has not outsourced).13 In the sequential outsourcing game considered here, however,
the raising rivals’ cost eﬀect is generated by soft or inoﬀensive play by the vertically
integrated firm A. Therefore, A’s adoption of the Puppy Dog strategy may be viewed
as a non-conventional way of raising rival’s cost.
Second, consider the Fat Cat strategy, where firm A outsources so as to induce
outsourcing by firm B. Under these conditions, outsourcing by B is profitable only
if A has already outsourced (∆1B < 0 < ∆2B), and B’s outsourcing increases A’s profit
(∆2−B > 0). Intuitively, the latter eﬀect follows from the fact that A ’s initial outsourcing
has increased its marginal cost to w(1, 0) > cA (by (A1)), making A a less aggressive
competitor. Further outsourcing by B (re-)establishes a level playing field where both
firms face even higher marginal cost of w(1, 1) > w(1, 0) > cB (by (A2)), thereby further
softening competition. In equilibrium, A will be ready to trigger such a sequence of
outsourcing decisions if the condition πA(1, 1) > πA(0, 0) is satisfied. This condition
implies that successive outsourcing decisions soften competition suﬃciently so as to
overcompensate the disadvantage of higher marginal cost.
Let us now consider the cases where outsourcing by firm B decreases firm A’s profit
(the second row in Table 2, with ∆1−B < 0 or ∆2−B < 0, respectively).
First, consider the Top Dog strategy, where firm A outsources so as to prevent
outsourcing by firm B. Under these circumstances, we know that outsourcing by firm B
alone is profitable (∆1B > 0). Furthermore, B’s outsourcing reducesA’s profit (∆1−B < 0).
In the following, we want to argue that in the outsourcing game under consideration,
firm A will never adopt the Top Dog strategy. To see why firm A will never adopt this
strategy, observe that the condition (∆1−B < 0) does not make sense in this particular
game. In fact, B’s outsourcing increases its marginal cost to w(0, 1) > cB, making B a
less aggressive competitor. As a result, B’s outsourcing will increase rather than decrease
A’s profit in virtually any oligopoly model of product market competition. Hence, A
12Of course, B’s outsourcing also eliminates the fixed cost FB, but this is irrelevant for determining
the intensity of competition in the product market.
13For example, a vertically integrated firm may refuse to deliver the input good to a vertically sepa-
rated downstream competitor.
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will not be willing to prevent B’s outsourcing by own outsourcing.
Second, consider the Lean & Hungry Look strategy, where firm A does not outsource
so as to avoid triggering outsourcing by firm B. Under these conditions, outsourcing by
B is profitable only if A has already outsourced (∆1B < 0 < ∆2B), and B’s outsourcing
reducesA’s profit (∆2−B < 0). To understand the latter eﬀect, suppose thatA has already
outsourced. Now, B’s decision to outsource will raise the input market price to w(1, 1) >
w(1, 0) (by (A2)), thereby increasing A’s marginal cost. In equilibrium, A will adopt
a Lean & Hungry Look strategy if the condition πA(0, 0) > πA(1, 1) is satisfied. This
condition implies that the softening of competition generated by successive outsourcing
is insuﬃcient to compensate A for its marginal cost increase.
3.2 Discussion
The above analysis suggests that in addition to saving fixed costs, a firm’s decision to
outsource the production of the input good serves to soften competition in the final
product market. Clearly, the softening of competition is most eﬀective if both firms find
it profitable to outsource. A sequence of two outsourcing decisions–an outsourcing
wave–may thus be viewed as an instance of collusion, if it is strategically triggered by
the adoption of a Fat Cat strategy on the part of the firm that moves first.14
If only one firm finds it profitable to outsource the production of the input good,
the motive of softening competition still persists. However, the adoption of a Puppy
Dog strategy by the first firm also reflects a raising rival’s cost motive. Given that the
softening of competition is attained by increasing marginal cost, each firm would prefer
the other firm to outsource (the Top Dog strategy will thus never be adopted). As it
turns out, it is the first firm–having a first-mover advantage–that decides about the
allocation of the cost increase.
Finally, if the softening of competition associated with successive outsourcing is in-
suﬃcient to compensate the first firm for its marginal cost increase, it will adopt the
Lean & Hungry Look strategy and not outsources so as to avoid triggering outsourcing
by firm B.
14Recall that, if market conditions are such that type (ii) of play occurs, B’s dominant strategy is to
outsource irrespective of A’s decision. In this case, a sequence of two outsourcing decisions may occur
for reasons unrelated to strategic considerations.
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4 An Example: Linear Cournot Duopoly
In this section, we illustrate the above analysis, using a simple linear Cournot model.
For this purpose, let us assume that the cost function of firm i is given by
Ci(qi) = (1− Vi)(αicqi + F ) + Vi(αiwqi), i = A,B,
where qi is the quantity produced by firm i and F > 0 is the fixed cost of producing
in-house (i.e. both firms face the same fixed cost). The term αi ≥ 1 represents firm i’s
eﬃciency in transforming inputs into outputs.15 Marginal costs are constant and given
by
C 0i = αi[(1− Vi)c+ Viw(Vi, Vj)],
depending on the firms’ outsourcing decisions Vi and Vj, i, j = A,B, i 6= j. If firm
i produces its input in-house (Vi = 0), the respective marginal cost for the input’s
production is c, while it is given by the input market price w if the firm is sourcing over
the input market (Vi = 1). Recall from the above discussion that the equilibrium input
price is given by w(0, 1) when only firm B outsources. In the reverse case, where only
firm A outsources, the wholesale price is w(1, 0). Finally, the equilibrium input price is
w(1, 1) when both firms outsource. Inverse demand is given by
P (Q) = a− bQ,
where P (Q) is the retail price, and Q ≡ qA + qB is aggregate output. In the following,
we assume for simplicity that αB ≡ 1 and αA ≡ α ≥ 1. That is, firm A is at best as
eﬃcient as firm B. The firms’ profits are summarized in Table 3 for the various industry
configurations.
Table 3: Firm profits in the linear Cournot model
πi(0, 0) πi(0, 1) πi(1, 0) πi(1, 1)
firm A (a+c−2αc)
2
9b − F
(a+w(0,1)−2αc)2
9b − F
(a+c−2αw(1,0))2
9b
(a+w(1,1)−2αw(1,1))2
9b
firm B (a+αc−2c)
2
9b − F
(a+αc−2w(0,1))2
9b
(a+αw(1,0)−2c)2
9b − F
(a+αw(1,1)−2w(1,1))2
9b
With these profits in mind, it is straightforward to calculate explicit expressions for
the reduced-form profit diﬀerentials introduced above (see Table 4). In the following
subsections, we shall use these expressions for discussing the conditions under which the
various outsourcing equilibria described in section 3 may come about. We consider each
of the candidate equilibria in turn.
15For instance, if firm i operates a 1:1 technology, firm i transforms one unit of the input good into
one unit of the final good, and we therefore have αi = 1. For a less eﬃcient firm, we have αi > 1.
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Table 4: Profit diﬀerentials in the linear Cournot model
profit diﬀerential
∆1B := πB(0, 1)− πB(0, 0) =
(a+αc−2w(0,1))2
9b −
(a+αc−2c)2
9b + F
∆2B := πB(1, 1)− πB(1, 0) =
(a+αw(1,1)−2w(1,1))2
9b −
(a+αw(1,0)−2c)2
9b + F
∆1−B := πA(0, 1)− πA(0, 0) =
(a+w(0,1)−2αc)2
9b −
(a+c−2αc)2
9b
∆2−B := πA(1, 1)− πA(1, 0) =
(a+w(1,1)−2αw(1,1))2
9b −
(a+c−2αw(1,0))2
9b
4.1 Puppy Dog
Recall from Table 2 that, in equilibrium, firm A will adopt the Puppy Dog strategy and
not outsource so as to induce outsourcing by firm B if both ∆1−B > 0 and ∆1B > 0 > ∆2B
are satisfied. Inspection of Table 4 indicates that ∆1−B > 0 will always be satisfied, since
w(0, 1) > c by assumption (A1). Now consider the second condition. The first part of
the second condition (∆1B > 0) may be written as
(a+ αc− 2c)2− [a+ αc− 2w(0, 1)]2 < 9bF. (1)
Inspection indicates that for (1) to be satisfied, B’s increase of marginal cost (w(0, 1)−c)
associated with outsourcing must be suﬃciently small relative to the fixed cost F of
producing the input in-house. That is, firmB’s marginal cost increase must not outweigh
the fixed cost savings associated with outsourcing. Otherwise, outsourcing by firm B
alone would not be profitable. The second part of the condition (∆2B < 0) may be
written as
(a+ αw(1, 0)− 2c)2− [a+ αw(1, 1)− 2w(1, 1)]2 > 9bF. (2)
Relation (2), i.e. ∆2B < 0, is more likely to hold the larger firmB’s marginal cost increase
(w(1, 1)− c) is relative to firm A’s marginal cost increase α(w(1, 1)−w(1, 0)), once firm
A has outsourced. Intuitively, this means that outsourcing is the less attractive for firm
B, the larger its own marginal cost increase and the smaller the raising rivals’ cost eﬀect
on firm A. Furthermore, (2) is more likely to be satisfied if firm A is relatively eﬃcient in
transforming inputs into outputs (α is relatively small), i.e. outsourcing is less attractive
for firm B if it faces an eﬃcient competitor A.
4.2 Fat Cat
According to Table 2, the adoption of a Fat Cat strategy requires that both ∆2−B > 0
and ∆1B < 0 < ∆2B are satisfied. The first of these conditions, which concerns the eﬀect
of B’s outsourcing on A’s profit, can be written as
w(1, 1)− c > 2α[w(1, 1)− w(1, 0)]. (3)
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Intuitively, (3) requires that firm B’s marginal cost increase (w(1, 1)−c) is large relative
to firm A’s marginal cost increase α(w(1, 1) − w(1, 0)), once firm A has outsourced.
Obviously, the condition is more likely to be satisfied the higher A’s eﬃciency level
(i.e. the smaller α). Now consider the condition ∆1B < 0, which can be written as
(a+ αc− 2c)2 − [a+ αc− 2w(0, 1)]2 > 9bF. (4)
Relation (4) implies that, in contrast to the Puppy Dog case, firm B must face a large
marginal cost increase (w(0, 1) − c), so as to make outsourcing unattractive despite of
the fixed cost savings. Otherwise, outsourcing by firm B alone would be profitable. The
condition ∆2B > 0, in turn, may be written as
(a+ αw(1, 0)− 2c)2 − [a+ αw(1, 1)− 2w(1, 1)]2 < 9bF. (5)
This condition is simply the reverse of (2). That is, (5) is more likely to be satisfied
the larger the raising rivals’ cost eﬀect on firm A, and the smaller the own marginal cost
increase. In this case, the condition is more likely to be satisfied if firm A is relatively
ineﬃcient (α is high).
However, for a Fat Cat strategy to be a part of an equilibrium, firm A also needs
to prefer a situation where both firms outsource over one where both firms produce in-
house (πA(1, 1) > πA(0, 0)); otherwise, firm A would not be willing to trigger successive
outsourcing. As can be easily checked, πA(1, 1) > πA(0, 0) is the more likely to hold the
smaller (w(1, 1) − c)(2α − 1) is compared to the fixed cost, F . Hence, in equilibrium,
the Fat Cat strategy is more likely to be adopted the smaller F , the more eﬃcient firm
A (the smaller α),16 and the smaller the marginal cost increase (w(1, 1)− c) when both
firms outsource.
4.3 Lean & Hungry Look
As indicated in Table 2, the Lean & Hungry Look strategy will be adopted in equilibrium
if both ∆1B < 0 < ∆2B and ∆2−B < 0 are satisfied. Hence, compared to the Fat Cat
strategy the only diﬀerence is that outsourcing by firm B has a negative rather than a
positive eﬀect on firm A’s profit (∆2−B < 0). Rewriting this condition yields
w(1, 1)− c < 2α [w(1, 1)− w(1, 0)] , (6)
which requires that firm A’s marginal cost increase α(w(1, 1) − w(1, 0)) is larger than
firmB’s increase (w(1, 1)− c) . Note that (6) is more easily satisfied if firm A is relatively
ineﬃcient (α is high).
16In combination with (5), this indicates that α must have an intermediate value for the Fat Cat
strategy to emerge in equilibrium.
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For a Lean & Hungry Look strategy to be a part of an equilibrium, however, firm
A also needs to prefer a situation where no firm outsources over one where both firms
outsource (πA(0, 0) > πA(1, 1)); otherwise, firm A would prefer successive outsourcing.
This is more likely to be the case, the larger (w(1, 1) − c)(2α − 1) is compared to the
fixed cost, F . Hence, a Lean & Hungry Look strategy is the more likely to emerge in
equilibrium the larger F , the less eﬃcient firm A is (the larger α), and the larger the
marginal cost increase (w(1, 1)− c) when both firms outsource.
4.4 Top Dog
Finally, consider the Top Dog strategy. We have pointed out above that, in equilibrium,
firm A will never adopt this strategy, since outsourcing by firm B alone cannot hurt firm
A. That is, ∆1−B < 0 cannot be satisfied. The linear Cournot model under consideration
nicely illustrates this finding. In order to satisfy ∆1−B < 0, we would need to assume
that w(0, 1) < c, which is in contradiction to assumption (A1).
4.5 A Numerical Example
In order to illustrate the above analysis, let us consider a numerical example of our
linear Cournot model with the following parameter values: a = 50, b = 1, c = 1, α =
4, w(1, 0) = 2.9 and w(0, 1) = 3. Furthermore, for each value of w(1, 1), we assume that
the level of fixed cost F is such that it does not dominate the strategic incentives for
outsourcing (not outsourcing, respectively).17 In Figure 1, the curve labelled ∆2B −∆1B
indicates how outsourcing by firm A aﬀects the profitability of firm B’s outsourcing
for various values of w(1, 1).18 The two other curves show how outsourcing by firm B
aﬀects the profit of firm A (∆1−B and ∆2−B, respectively). Since w(VA, VB) is increasing
in Vi, i = A,B by (A2), we solely consider cases where w(1, 1) > 3.
First note that, independent of the value of w(1, 1), firmA is positively aﬀected byB’s
outsourcing alone (∆1−B > 0). It follows immediately that the Top Dog will not be part of
a strategy combination forming an equilibrium. If w(1, 1) is relatively small, outsourcing
by B alone is profitable, whereas successive outsourcing is not (∆2B−∆1B < 0). Since the
profit of firm A is positively aﬀected by B’s outsourcing alone (∆1−B > 0), A will adopt
the Puppy Dog strategy. If w(1, 1) is at an intermediate level, successive outsourcing is
17For example, if w(1, 1) is in a medium range such that firm A should adopt the Fat Cat strategy for
strategic reasons (see Figure 1), F must be suﬃciently large for A’s profit to be higher with successive
outsourcing than with no outsourcing.
18For instance, if outsourcing by A prevents further outsourcing (∆1B > 0 > ∆2B), we have ∆2B−∆1B <
0. Conversely, if outsourcing by A triggers further outsourcing (∆1B < 0 < ∆2B), we have ∆2B−∆1B > 0.
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of firm A ’s business strategies for the parameter values a = 50, b =
1, c = 1, α = 4, w(1, 0) = 2.9, w(0, 1) = 3, and 3 < w(1, 1) ≤ 3.3.
profitable from B’s point of view (∆2B−∆1B > 0). Also, outsourcing by B aﬀects firm A’s
profit positively, and firm A will adopt the Fat Cat strategy so as to trigger outsourcing
by firm B. Finally, if w(1, 1) is large, successive outsourcing is still profitable from firm
B’s point of view. However, outsourcing by firm B aﬀects firm A’s profit negatively.
Firm A will thus adopt the Lean & Hungry Look strategy.
5 Conclusions
As we have shown in this paper, firms in vertically related industries may strategically
outsource the production of an input good to an imperfectly competitive input market
so as to soften competition in the final product market. More specifically, if firms face
a trade-oﬀ between making irreversible investments and incurring higher marginal cost
when making their “make-or-buy” decisions, and if, in addition, input prices vary with
the industry’s vertical structure, outsourcing may serve as an instrument of collusion or
raising rivals’ cost.
Our analysis of a reduced-form model has demonstrated that (depending on para-
meter values) three diﬀerent types of equilibria may emerge:
(i) There may be an asymmetric outsourcing equilibrium where one firm produces
the input good in-house whereas the other acquires it from the input market. In this
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equilibrium, the firm that moves first follows a Puppy Dog strategy and strategically
abstains from outsourcing so as to not prevent outsourcing by the second firm. By
preventing an initial increase of the input price, the second firm is induced to outsource
and thus to increase its own marginal cost.19
(ii) There may be a symmetric equilibrium where both firms outsource. In this
equilibrium, the first firm decides to outsource so as to trigger further outsourcing by
the second firm (the Fat Cat strategy). Firms successively outsource production to the
input market to mutually raise their marginal costs, thereby softening competition in
the final product market. That is, firms may generate a wave of consecutive outsourcing
decisions so as to collude in the retail market.
(iii) There may be another symmetric equilibrium where none of the firms outsources.
In this equilibrium, the first firm does not outsource to avoid triggering outsourcing by
the second firm (the Lean & Hungry Look strategy). Intuitively, this equilibrium may
emerge if the softening of competition generated by a wave of outsourcing decisions is
insuﬃcient to compensate the first firm for its marginal cost increase. The first firm will
then strategically prevent successive outsourcing.
Our results apply to various forms of product market competition. They suggest that
to better understand the economics of outsourcing, it is crucial to account for the price
eﬀects of outsourcing both at the downstream and the upstream level of the industry.
In fact, upstream price eﬀects of strategic outsourcing might be even more important in
vertically-related industries with specific (rather than non-specific) input goods. Future
research will have to address this question.
19As was pointed out above, a reversed asymmetric equilibrium where the first firm outsources so as
to prevent outsourcing by the second firm (a Top Dog strategy) does not exist, as the first firm will
actually benefit from the second firm’s increase of marginal cost associated with outsourcing, provided
that it has not already outsourced.
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